

Philosophy of mind [PY 3100]

Introductory reading

Braddon-Mitchell, D. and F. Jackson (eds) The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

Kim, J. The Philosophy of Mind. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996).

McGinn, C. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) second edition.

Sample examination questions

- 1. What does the possibility of hallucination reveal about the nature of perceptual experience?
- 2. Can one be in error about one's own mind?
- 3. 'If mental causes were not physical, they would be epiphenomenal.' Discuss.
- 4. Is there something it is like to hold a belief?
- 5. 'Mental representations represent things in virtue of a causal relation which holds between representation and world.' Discuss.
- 6. How should we understand the relationship between a belief ascription and the belief itself?
- 7. To what extent are our beliefs about other people's mental states justified by an inference to the best explanation?
- 8. 'If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do...' (WITTGENSTEIN). Is this true?
- 9. What, if anything, would Frank Jackson's Mary learn on seeing something red for the first time? If she learns something, does that show that physicalism is false?
- 10. What is the 'explanatory gap' and does it cast doubt on the truth of materialism?
- 11. 'If physicalism were true, zombies would not be conceivable.' Discuss.
- 12. Can we understand the mind in terms of dispositions to behaviour?
- 13. 'Functionalism can provide a good account of our beliefs and desires but not our tickles and pains.' Discuss.
- 14. 'To explain why a subject acted as she did is to situate her action in a wider rational context; it is not to provide a causal account of her movements.' Discuss.
- 15. Are emotions feelings of changes in the body?